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LINGERING QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DEVISE OF
BLACK'S ACRE: HOW MANY WITNESSES ARE
REQUIRED TO PROVE THE EXECUTION OF A LOST
WILL?
Sarah Shirey
Abstract: Prior to the 1994 revisions to Washington's lost will statute, courts required that
execution of a lost will be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In In re Estate of
Black, the Washington State Supreme Court announced that under the revised lost will
statute, execution of a lost will must be shown by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
However, the Black court did not clearly define the quantum of proof necessary to meet this
new burden. The dissent in Black read the majority opinion as creating a "two witness
requirement," necessitating testimony from both attesting witnesses to meet the new burden.
This Comment argues that the Black majority created a "one witness standard," by which one
witness with sufficient personal knowledge of all statutory elements of the lost will's
execution may satisfy the clear, cogent, and convincing burden. A careful examination of the
Black court's evidentiary analysis reveals that rather than searching for two witnesses, the
court looked for, but failed to find, a single witness with sufficient personal knowledge to
meet the "one witness standard." In addition, those who perceive a two witness requirement
confuse the statutory elements for executing a will with the requirements for proving
execution of a lost will. Finally, evidentiary standards used in fraud cases under
Washington's probate code as well as case law from other jurisdictions support application of
the "one witness standard" to prove execution by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
Since Washington's territorial days, the proof necessary to admit a
lost will to probate has been governed by the lost will statute.t Under
this original statute, admission of a lost will required proof of the will's
existence at the time of the testator's death.2 This requirement nearly
barred the probate of lost wills in Washington. 3 In 1994, Washington
removed this requirement and made several other revisions to the
statute.4 Commentators predicted that the removal of this requirement
would facilitate the admission of lost wills by significantly diminishing
the burden for probate of these Wills. 5 However, a recent decision by the
1. Act of Jan. 27, 1860, ch. 1, § 70, 1860 Wash. Terr. Laws 205 (current version at WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.20.070 (2004)).
2. Id.
3. See MARK REUTLINGER & WILLIAM C. OLTMAN, WASHINGTON LAW OF WILLS AND
INTESTATE SUCCESSION 20 (Supp. 1994) (calling proof of will's existence an "impossible
requirement").
4. See Act of April 1, 1994, ch. 221, § 20, 1994 Wash. Sess. Laws 1149.
5. See REUTLINGER & OLTMAN, supra note 3, at 20.
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Washington State Supreme Court creates another obstacle for probating
a lost will.
6
The Washington State Supreme Court first considered the recent
revisions to the lost will statute in In re Estate of Black.7 The court used
this opportunity to "clarify" the burden of proof necessary to show
proper execution of a lost will. 8 In Washington, a validly executed will
must be in writing, signed by the testator, and signed by at least two
"attesting" witnesses.9 The court held that in the absence of an original
will, execution of a lost will must be proven by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. 10 However, Black creates confusion regarding the
quantum of evidence necessary to meet this new burden." Questions
arise as to whether the testimony of one or two witnesses is required to
establish valid execution of a lost will under the clear, cogent, and
convincing standard.12
Because the court found testimony from a single attesting witness
insufficient to prove execution of the lost will, the Black dissent
interpreted the court's decision as creating a "two witness
requirement."' 3 No witness in Black possessed sufficient personal
knowledge of all the elements required to validly execute a will.' 4
Specifically, no testifying witness could adequately identify the second
attesting witness.15 In lieu of direct testimony, circumstantial evidence
supported the inference that a notary public acted as the second attesting
witness.' 6 The Black court concluded that this evidence fell short of the
clear, cogent, and convincing standard.' 7 Justice Richard B. Sanders
concluded in his dissent that this holding demands testimony from two
6. See In re Estate of Black, 153 Wash. 2d 152, 165, 102 P.3d 796, 803 (2004) (raising
evidentiary burden for proving execution of lost will from "preponderance of evidence" standard to
"clear, cogent, and convincing" standard).
7. 153 Wash. 2d 152, 102 P.3d 796 (2004).
8. Id. at 157, 102 P.3d at 799.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.070 (2004).
10. Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 163, 102 P.3d at 802.
11. Id. at 183, 102 P.3d at 812 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804 (majority opinion) (finding testimony from one attesting
witness who failed to recall name of second attesting witness insufficient to prove will's execution).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 167-68, 102 P.3d at 804-05.
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attesting witnesses to prove the execution of a lost will.,
8
This Comment argues that Black adopts only a "one witness standard"
to establish valid execution of a lost will by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. Under this "one witness standard" a party may
prove proper execution of a lost will through the testimony of a single
witness with sufficient personal knowledge that the will was in writing,
signed by the testator, and witnessed by two witnesses. 19 The Black court
employed a "one witness standard" in its evidentiary analysis, searching
for a single witness with sufficient personal knowledge of the lost will's
execution rather than two witnesses. 20 Those who believe the court used
a "two witness requirement" confuse the statutory elements required to
validly execute a will with the requirements to prove a will's execution
after the original will has been lost.2 Additionally, reading Black to
adopt a "one witness standard" is consistent with the use of the same
clear, cogent, and convincing evidentiary standard in other Washington
probate contexts. Finally, the "one witness standard" interpretation is
in accord with cases from other jurisdictions that apply similar
evidentiary standards to the execution of lost wills.
23
Part I introduces Washington's lost will statute and its evolution, and
discusses the common law development related to it. Part II presents
Black, the Washington State Supreme Court's first consideration of the
recent revisions to the lost will statute. Part III analogizes the evidence
presented in Black with evidence used to satisfy the clear, cogent, and
convincing standards in other Washington probate contexts and in lost
will cases from other jurisdictions. Part IV argues that, contrary to the
dissent's interpretation, proof of proper execution may be shown by one
witness with sufficient personal knowledge under Washington's new
clear, cogent, and convincing standard. This Comment concludes that
Black's one witness standard, while less burdensome than a two witness
requirement, contravenes the intent of the legislature by creating a new
18. Id. at 183, 102 P.3d at 812 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
19. See infra Part V.A.
20. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 167, 102 P.3d at 804 (finding testimony from one attesting
witness who failed to recall name of second attesting witness insufficient to prove will's execution).
21. See id. at 183, 102 P.3d at 812 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
22. See In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wash. 2d 518, 533, 957 P.2d 755, 763 (1998); In re Estate of
Mumby, 97 Wash. App. 385, 391, 982 P.2d 1219, 1223 (1999); In re Estate of Kessler, 95 Wash.
App. 358, 375-76, 977 P.2d 591, 602 (1999).
23. See In re Estate of Mecello, 633 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Neb. 2001); In re Will of McCauley, 565
S.E.2d 88, 95 (N.C. 2002).
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evidentiary obstacle to the admission of lost wills.
I. THE LOST WILL STATUTE DICTATES THE EVIDENTIARY
BURDEN FOR ADMITTING A LOST WILL TO PROBATE
Washington's first lost will statute appears in the territorial laws of
1860.24 Throughout the 1900s, the Washington State Supreme Court
developed a body of common law related to the lost will statute.2 5 The
court determined that valid execution of a lost will must be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence.26 However, the statutory requirement
calling for proof of the existence of a lost will at the time of the
testator's death barred the admission of many lost wills.2 7 Although it
still contains remnants of the original, the lost will statute underwent a
major revision in 1994 in order to make it easier for parties wishing to
probate lost wills.
28
A. The Prior Lost Will Statute Contained Three Evidentiary
Requirements for Admitting a Lost Will to Probate
In Washington, the statutory requirements to execute a will are
minimal. 29 A will is validly executed if it is "(1) in writing, (2) signed by
the testator, and (3) attested by two or more competent witnesses, by
subscribing their names to the will, or by signing an affidavit that
24. Act of Jan. 27, 1860 ch. 1, § 70, 1860 Wash. Terr. Laws (current version at WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.20.070 (2004)).
25. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nelson, 85 Wash. 2d 602, 605, 537 P.2d 765, 768 (1975) (allowing
probate of lost will because circumstances surrounding decedent's death showed that will had been
stolen); In re Gardner's Estate, 69 Wash. 2d 229, 235, 417 P.2d 948, 952 (1966) (admitting lost will
to probate where only one attesting witness could recall witnessing will); In re Neubert's Estate, 59
Wash. 2d 678, 685, 369 P.2d 838, 843 (1962) (allowing proof of office practices to prove valid
execution of lost will); In re Peters' Estate, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 860, 264 P.2d 1109, 1117 (1953)
(stating that proof of execution of lost will may only be shown by preponderance of evidence); In re
Borrow, 123 Wash. 128, 130, 212 P. 149, 150 (1923) (finding that proof of execution of lost will
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence).
26. See Peters, 43 Wash. 2d at 860, 264 P.2d at 1117 (finding that clear and distinct proof
referred to in lost will statute only referred to provisions of instrument and not execution).
27. Neubert, 59 Wash. 2d at 687, 369 P.2d at 843-44; See In re Kerckhof's Estate, 13 Wash. 2d
469, 482, 125 P.2d 284, 290 (1942).
28. See Act of April 1, 1994, ch. 221, § 20, 1994 Wash. Sess. Laws 1149 (removing requirement
of proof that lost will existed at time of testator's death).
29. In re Estate of Black, 153 Wash. 2d 152, 180, 102 P.3d 796, 811 (2004) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
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complies with RCW 11.20.020(2). ' '30 Satisfying these requirements
serves as prima facie evidence to admit a will.31 However, the question
arises of how to prove these three elements in order to probate a will that
has been lost or destroyed. Washington's lost will statute was adopted to
address this issue.32
The original lost will statute of 1860 contained three basic
requirements to prove the existence of a lost will.33 First, proof of
execution and validity of the will had to be in writing and signed by the
witnesses.3 4 Second, the will's provisions had to be proved "clearly and
distinctly" by at least two credible witnesses. 35 And finally, the will had
to be shown to have either been in existence at the time of the testator's
death or fraudulently destroyed.36
B. Courts Interpreting the Original Lost Will Statute Demonstrated
that the Execution of a Lost Will May Be Shown by a
Preponderance of the Evidence
Early decisions interpreting the original lost will statute evoked the
statute's common law roots to determine the proper evidentiary standard
for establishing valid execution.37 The case law dates back to 1895 with
Harris v. Harris,38 where the court stated that evidence to prove
execution of a lost will must be "cogent and satisfactory. '39 Eight years
later, in In re Borrow,4 0 the court went further, specifying that the
evidence of a lost will's execution must be "clear and convincing." 4 The
Borrow court cited Clark v. Turner,42 an 1897 Nebraska Supreme Court
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.070 (2004).
31. Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 181, 102 P.3d at 811 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 164, 102 P.3d at 802 (majority opinion).
33. Act of Jan. 27, 1860, ch. 1, § 70, 1860 Wash. Terr. Laws (current version at WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.20.070).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See In re Borrow, 123 Wash. 128, 130, 212 P. 149, 150 (1923); Harris v. Harris, 10 Wash.
555,561, 39 P. 148, 151 (1895).
38. 10 Wash. 555, 39 P. 148 (1895).
39. Id. at 559, 39 P. at 150.
40. 123 Wash. 128, 212 P. 149 (1923).
41. Idat 130, 212 P. at 150.
42. 69 N.W. 843 (Neb. 1897).
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opinion, as the relevant authority on lost will evidentiary questions.43
The Nebraska court compared the policies underlying the evidentiary
burdens set forth in lost wills statutes with the policies underlying the
statute of frauds, explaining how both statutes mandate strict evidentiary
requirements to meet the clear and convincing burden.4 The Clark court
explained that the lost wills statute, like the statute of frauds, mandates
the use of direct rather than circumstantial evidence.45 Anything less
would frustrate the legislative intent behind the statutes. 46
In 1953, the Washington State Supreme Court, interpreting the
original lost will statute, stated that "preponderance of the evidence" was
the proper standard for proving execution, while the "clear and cogent"
standard only applied to proof of the lost will's provisions.47 Following
this decision, several courts found that testifying witnesses need not
have "personal knowledge" of a lost will's execution to be capable of
satisfying the "preponderance" burden.48 For instance, in In re Neubert's
Estate,49 the court found a secretary's testimony sufficient to prove a lost
will's proper execution, 50 even though the secretary had no personal
knowledge of the will-signing.51 Instead, the secretary testified to her
firm's office practices for recording executed wills. 52 Likewise, in In re
Gardner's Estate,53 the court found proper execution where only one
witness could recall executing the will.54 The other witness could not
definitively recall signing the will, but testified to having signed a
variety of documents for the testatrix over the years.55 The court found
sufficient evidence to show proper execution by a preponderance of the
43. Borrow, 123 Wash. at 130, 212 P. at 150 (citing Clark, 69 N.W. at 846) (noting Clark court's
discussion of how policies underlying evidentiary rules relating to statute of frauds should be
applied in lost will cases to prevent submission of false wills).
44. Clark, 69 N.W. at 846.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. In re Peters' Estate, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 860-61, 264 P.2d 1109, 1117 (1953).
48. See In re Gardner's Estate, 69 Wash. 2d 229, 235, 417 P.2d 948, 952 (1966); In re Neubert's
Estate, 59 Wash. 2d 678, 685, 369 P.2d 838, 843 (1962).
49. 59 Wash. 2d 678, 369 P.2d 838 (1962).
50. See id. at 685, 369 P.2d at 843.
51. Id. at 683, 369 P.2d at 841.
52. Id.
53. 69 Wash. 2d 229, 417 P.2d 948 (1966).
54. Id. at 236, 417 P.2d at 952.
55. See id.
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evidence despite the lack of definitive testimony.
56
C. The Washington Legislature Modified the Original Lost Wills
Statute to Make it Easier for Proponents of Lost Wills
The decisions interpreting Washington's lost will statute demonstrate
that the third requirement-proof of the will's existence at the time of
the testator's death-proved to be a near bar to those attempting to
probate a lost will.57 Failure to show the actual physical existence of the
will at the time of the testator's death raised the presumption that the
testator destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it.58 As a result,
without clear and distinct evidence of a lost will's existence and location
at the time of death, the will could not be probated.59 Given that most
lost wills went missing during the testator's lifetime, evidence of the
will's existence at the time of death proved very difficult to establish.60
In 1994, the legislature attempted to make the statute more accessible
by removing the third requirement-proof of existence of the will at the
time of death. 61 The resulting statute contains two basic requirements for
admitting a lost or destroyed will.62 First, "any" witnesses who have
testified to the execution and validity of the will must put their testimony
in writing.63 Second, the provisions of a lost or destroyed will must be
56. See id.
57. See In re Kerckhof's Estate, 13 Wash. 2d 469, 476-77, 125 P.2d 284, 287 (1942); Neubert, 59
Wash. 2d at 687, 369 P.2d at 843-44.
58. See Kerckhof 13 Wash. 2d at 477, 125 P.2d at 287.
59. Id. at 482, 125 P.2d at 290.
60. See REUTLINGER & OLTMAN, supra note 3, at 20.
61. See id.
62. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.070 (2004). Proof of a lost or destroyed will requires a
showing of the following:
(1) If a will has been lost or destroyed under circumstances such that the loss or destruction
does not have the effect of revoking the will, the court may take proof of the execution and
validity of the will and establish it, notice to all persons interested having been first given. The
proof must be reduced to writing and signed by any witnesses who have testified as to the
execution and validity, and must be filed with the clerk of the court.
(2) The provisions of a lost or destroyed will must be proved by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence, consisting at least in part of a witness to either its contents or the authenticity of a
copy of the will.
(3) When a lost or destroyed will is established under subsections (1) and (2) of this section, its
provisions must be distinctly stated in the judgment establishing it, and the judgment must be
recorded as wills are required to be recorded. A personal representative may be appointed by
the court in the same manner as is herein provided with reference to original wills presented to
the court for probate.
Id.
63. Id. § 11.20.070(1).
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proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence consisting of at least
"a" witness to either its contents or the authenticity of a copy of the
will.
64
In sum, the lost will statute has long governed the proof necessary to
admit a lost will in Washington. Under the original statute, proof of
execution had to be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. In
practice, the requirement to prove a lost will's existence at the time of
the testator's death acted as a near bar to the admission of lost wills. In
1994, the Washington State Legislature attempted to facilitate admission
of lost wills by removing evidentiary obstacles, including proof of
existence at the time of death.
II. THE BLACK COURT CLARIFIED THE EVIDENTIARY
STANDARD FOR PROVING EXECUTION OF A LOST WILL
In 2004, the Washington State Supreme Court visited the revised lost
wills statute for the first time, announcing that proper execution of a lost
will must be shown by "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence.65 In
Black, the court examined evidence surrounding the alleged execution of
Margaret Black's lost will. 66 The court found the evidence failed to
prove valid execution by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.67 Two
Justices dissented, arguing that the court's failure to admit the lost will
created a "two witness requirement" to meet the new standard.68
A. The Black Court Considered the Alleged Execution of Margaret
Black's Lost Will
The Black case involved a lost will allegedly executed by Margaret
Black in August 1993.69 Upon Margaret's death in October 2000, neither
the original will nor an executed copy could be found.70 The beneficiary
of the lost will, Margaret's daughter, Myrna Black, petitioned to have an
unsigned copy of the will admitted to probate under the lost will
64. Id. § 11.20.070(2).
65. In re Estate of Black, 153 Wash. 2d 152, 161-63, 102 P.3d 796, 801-02 (2004) (explaining
that since court's last ruling on lost will statute, legislature has amended statute and revised
requirements).
66. See id. at 156-57, 102 P.3d at 799.
67. Id. at 174, 102 P.3d at 808.
68. Id. at 175, 102 P.3d at 808 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 157, 102 P.3d at 799 (majority opinion).
70. See id. at 159, 102 P.3d at 800.
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statute.7" Beneficiaries of another will, executed by Margaret in 1992,
objected to Myrna's petition on the grounds that Myrna failed to prove
proper execution of the 1993 will.72 The trial court admitted the lost will
to probate, finding as a matter of law that Myrna met the requirements of
the lost will statute.73 The Washington State Court of Appeals reversed
the order to admit the will and remanded the case. 4 The Washington
State Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstantial evidence
surrounding the identity of the second attesting witness to the alleged
lost will failed to meet the "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard
provided in the revised lost will statute.75
B. The Evidence Presented by Myrna Black Was Insufficient to Prove
Valid Execution of the Lost Will by Clear, Cogent, and Convincing
Evidence
The Black court held that Myrna failed to show proper execution of
the 1993 will by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.76 In order to
prove execution, the court considered affidavits from three witnesses.
7 7
The first, Paul Blauert, served as the attorney who prepared 
the will. 78
Blauert testified that he prepared the 1993 will at Myrna's request, and
that the provisions in the unsigned copy of the will attached to his
affidavit matched those he gave to Myrna in August 1993. 79 Blauert
stated he was not present at the will-signing, but that when Myrna
returned the will to him after the signing, he noticed that Margaret had
executed the will on August 14, 1993, and that it was signed by two
attesting witnesses. 80 Blauert could not recall the names of the attesting
witnesses. 81 After Margaret's death, Blauert could not find the will. 82 He
71. See id. at 157, 102 P.3d at 799.
72. Id. at 159, 102 P.3d at 800.
73. Id. at 157, 102 P.3d at 799.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 174, 102 P.3d at 808.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 158, 102 P.3d at 799.
78. See id. While the court discussed Robert Reiter's affidavit first and last, this Comment
considers it last.
79. See id. at 158-59, 102 P.3d at 800.
80. See id. at 159, 102 P.3d at 800.
81. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804.
82. See id. at 159, 102 P.3d at 800.
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therefore provided an electronic copy of the will to Myrna.83
Taylor, the notary public, served as the second witness.84 Taylor could
neither recall witnessing the will nor meeting Myrna or the others
involved in the alleged execution. 85 However, Taylor did notarize apower of attorney document for Margaret on August 14, 1993, the same
day Margaret allegedly executed the lost will.86 Taylor testified that she
must have "personally witnessed" Margaret sign the power of attorney
document, because she only notarized documents in the presence of the
signing party. Taylor, therefore, speculated that she may have also
witnessed a will for Margaret that same day, but she could not recall the
event.88
The third witness, Robert Reiter, an attorney and friend of the
beneficiary, testified that he accompanied Myrna on her trip from
California to Washington to visit Margaret in August 1993 .89 Reiter
testified that he and Myrna received the unexecuted will from Blauert in
Seattle before driving to Margaret's home in Walla Walla,
Washington." Reiter stated that on August 14, 1993, he read the will to
Margaret and verified its provisions with her.91 He then witnessed her
initial each page and sign the will in his presence and in the presence of
a notary public.92 He could not recall the name of the notary public who
served as the second attesting witness, but relied on the power of
attorney document notarized by Taylor on the same day to infer that
Taylor served as the second attesting witness.93
In considering the witness testimony, the court first clarified the use
of witness testimony to prove proper execution of a lost will: "Absent a
signed attestation clause, execution may also be proved if witnesses
testify they signed the document in the presence of the testator and
testify to facts showing attestation as a matter of law.",94 The court
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 183, 102 P.3d at 812 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 158, 102 P.3d at 799 (majority opinion).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 166, 102 P.3d at 803.
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explained that under the lost will statute a witness is "one who has
personal knowledge of the fact that the will was signed 
by the testator. ' 95
Citing the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court further specified that a
witness may only testify to "events within his or her personal
knowledge."
96
Using this carefully crafted definition of "witness," the court
concluded that the evidence of valid execution was insufficient to satisfy
the clear, cogent, and convincing standard.97 First, the court determined
that Blauert's testimony was insufficient because he neither witnessed
the execution nor recalled the names of the attesting witnesses.
98 Next,
because Taylor lacked any personal knowledge of the will-signing, the
court determined Taylor's testimony to be inadequate to show she served
as the second attesting witness. 99 Finally, while the court found Reiter's
testimony sufficient to prove that he acted as the first attesting witness,
his testimony could not prove the presence of a second witness by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence because he failed to recall the identity
of the second witness. 100 The court found Reiter's testimony insufficient
to prove that Taylor acted as the second witness because Reiter relied on
circumstantial evidence.' 0 ' The court determined that just because
Taylor notarized a power of attorney document on the same day the lost
will was allegedly executed did not mean Taylor witnessed the will.
102
C. The Dissent Interpreted Black as Creating a "Two Witness
Requirement" to Prove the Execution of a Lost Will
Dissenting in Black, Justice Sanders, joined by Justice Tom
Chambers, argued that the court erred in finding that proper execution
was not proved as a matter of law.10 3 The dissent asserted that the
majority's failure to probate the lost 1993 will conflicted with prior case
law by creating a "two witness requirement."'10 4 Citing both Neubert and
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 166, 102 P.3d at 804.
97. Id. at 167 n.9, 102 P.3d at 804 n.9.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 168, 102 P.3d at 805.
100. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804.
101. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 805.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 175, 102 P.3d at 808 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 183, 102 P.3d at 812.
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Gardner, Justice Sanders pointed out, "we have not once, but twice held
execution of a lost will was sufficiently proved by less than two
witnesses affirmatively testifying to the execution of the will.' °5 In
Neubert, the court found proper execution, although "not one attesting
witness testified to the actual execution of the lost will.' ' 10 6 In Gardner,
the court found sufficient evidence of proper execution of a lost will
where only one witness could recall with any certainty attesting to the
lost will. 10 7 Justice Sanders stated that "the majority discount[ed] these
authorities claiming 'only one attesting witness testified."" 0' 8 The dissent
found that the majority's "attempted distinction based on 'one' witness's
testimony" ignored precedent by requiring that two witnesses
affirmatively testify to the execution of the lost will. 09 The dissent
concluded that taken together, the evidence in Black led to but one
conclusion: Taylor served as the second attesting witness. 10
In sum, the majority adopted a new standard to require that the
execution of a lost will must be shown by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence. The facts in Black suggest that Margaret properly executed a
lost will in 1993; however, the court found that the evidence presented
failed to establish proper execution by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence. The dissent in Black not only disagreed with the outcome of
the case, but also raised concerns that the majority disregarded prior
Washington probate law by creating a "two witness requirement" under
the clear, cogent, and convincing burden.
III. THE NEW BURDEN RESEMBLES STANDARDS USED IN
OTHER CONTEXTS AND JURISDICTIONS
By adopting the clear, cogent, and convincing standard, the Black
court aligned proof of a lost will's execution with the evidentiary
standards set forth in other Washington probate contexts, as well as
those used in other jurisdictions."' First, Washington requires that the
105. See id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Neubert's Estate, 59 Wash. 2d 678, 685, 369 P.2d 838,
843 (1962)); In re Gardner's Estate, 69 Wash. 2d 229, 235, 417 P.2d 948, 952 (1966)).
106. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 183, 102 P.3d at 812 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
107. See Gardner, 69 Wash. at 236, 417 P.2d at 952.
108. Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 183, 102 P.3d at 812 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
109. See id. (emphasis added).
110. See id. at 184-85, 102 P.3d at 813.
111. See infra Part IV.C.
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elements of fraudulent inducement of a will be shown by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence. 12 Second, several other states require that the
proof of valid execution of a lost will be shown by clear and convincing
evidence." 
3
A. Washington Courts Employ the Clear, Cogent, and Convincing
Standard in Other Probate Contexts, Including Fraud
The Washington Probate Code applies the clear, cogent, and
convincing standard in several types of will contests." 4 Will contestants
must show undue influence," 5 lack of testamentary capacity,"
6 and
fraudulent inducement" 7 by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to
successfully challenge a will. Findings of undue influence and lack of
capacity turn on the testator's state of mind, 1' 8 requiring courts to look
into circumstantial evidence119 or expert testimony.120  In contrast,
fraudulent inducement requires a showing of nine elements
12 to prove
that the testator was deceived when executing a will.'22 Among these
112. In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wash. 2d 518, 533, 957 P.2d 755, 763 (1998).
113. See In re Estate of Mecello, 633 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Neb. 2001); In re Will of McCauley, 565
S.E.2d 88, 95 (N.C. 2002).
114. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.091 (2004) (setting forth elements necessary to prove
intentional omission of minor child from will); id. § 11.12.095 (setting forth elements necessary to
prove intentional omission of surviving spouse from will); id. § 11.20.070 (setting forth elements
necessary to prove provisions of lost will).
115. Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 535, 957 P.2d at 764.
116. See In re Peters' Estate, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 861, 264 P.2d 1109, 1117 (1953).
117. Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 533, 957 P.2d at 763.
118. See Peters, 43 Wash. 2d at 861, 264 P.2d at 1117; Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 535, 957 P.2d at
764; In re Dand's Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 158, 164, 247 P.2d 1016, 1020 (1952).
119. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 535, 957 P.2d at 764; Dand, 41 Wash. 2d at 163, 247 P.2d at
1020. Proof of undue influence by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence requires courts to view
the circumstances and conditions surrounding the execution of a will to show that the testator's
mind was "coerced." See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 535, 957 P.2d at 764; Dand, 41 Wash. 2d at 163,
247 P.2d at 1020.
120. See Peters, 43 Wash. 2d at 862, 264 P.2d at 1118. Showing lack of testamentary capacity
also differs from proof of execution because it requires expert medical testimony to demonstrate by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the testator lacked the requisite capacity. See id.
121. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 535 n.4, 957 P.2d at 763 n.4. The elements of fraud are:
(1) representation of an existing fact; (2) materiality of the representation; (3) falsity of the
representation; (4) knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard as to its truth; (5) intent to
induce reliance on the representation; (6) ignorance of the falsity; (7) reliance on the truth of
the representation; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) damages.
See id. (citing Farrell v. Score, 67 Wash. 2d 957, 958-59, 411 P.2d 146, 148 (1966)).
122. See Dand, 41 Wash. 2d at 164, 247 P.2d at 1020.
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nine elements, a party must show that a person benefiting from the
contested will made a false representation to the testator.123 Washington
courts require direct rather than circumstantial evidence that this false
representation took place. 124
In In re Estate of Lint,125 the court articulated the application of the
clear, cogent, and convincing standard to prove fraudulent
representation. 126 Lint involved a will contest in which opponents of a
will claimed the beneficiary, Christian Lint, fraudulently procured the
will of Estelle Lint. 2 7 Christian, a man eighteen years younger than
Estelle, courted Estelle in the years before her death. 28 The trial court
found that the opponents of the will presented clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence of the elements of fraud because Christian falsely
represented to Estelle that he loved her.1 29 Christian appealed on the
grounds that "a person's statements of love for another cannot be held to
be a fraudulent misrepresentation because such a determination requires
the trial court to plumb human emotions and make judgments about
feelings that are entirely subjective.' 30 Despite acknowledging the trial
court's findings that the facts taken together supported fraudulent
representation, the Washington State Supreme Court stated that the
clear, cogent, and convincing burden requires more than merely
circumstantial evidence. 131 Thus, even the fact that Christian was seeing
other women at the time he professed his love to Estelle could not
sufficiently prove that his "expressions of love for Estelle were less than
sincere." 132 The court stated that opponents of the will must present
direct evidence to prove false representation by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.133 For instance, false representation may have been
123. Id. at 163, 247 P.2d at 1020.
124. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 763; In re Estate of Mumby, 97 Wash. App. 385,
392-93, 982 P.2d 1219, 1224 (1999); In re Estate of Kessler, 95 Wash. App. 358, 375-76, 977 P.2d
591, 602 (1999).
125. 135 Wash. 2d 518, 957 P.2d 755 (1998).
126. See id. at 533, 957 P.2d at 763.
127. Id. at 521, 957 P.2d at 757.
128. Id. at 522, 957 P.2d at 757.
129. See id. at 533, 957 P.2d at 763.
130. Id. at 534, 957 P.2d at 763.
131. See id. (explaining that although facts seemed to indicate that Christian was not sincere in
expressing his love, the clear, cogent, and convincing standard requires direct evidence of
misrepresentation).
132. Id.
133. See id.
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shown if a witness had overheard Christian admit that he lied to Estelle
about his feelings toward her. 134 The court explained that only such
direct evidence "might well withstand a challenge that it was not
supported by sufficient quantum of evidence."'
' 35
Similarly, in In re Estate of Kessler,136 the court applied the clear,
cogent, and convincing standard in the fraudulent inducement context.'
37
In Kessler, Frances and Thomas Trimm, opponents of Lavina Kessler's
will, claimed that the beneficiary, Tami Davis, fraudulently induced
Kessler to write a new will. 38 The Trimms claimed that Davis told
Kessler that the Trimms were mishandling her money. 39 According to
the testimony of Kessler's guardian ad litem, Kessler believed that the
Trimms were not honest people. 40 Furthermore, Kessler told her
guardian that she had this belief because Davis had told her so.
14 1
Acknowledging that such testimony supported the inference of
fraudulent inducement, the court found that the testimony failed to
clearly, cogently, and convincingly prove false representation by the
beneficiary. 142 The court inferred that in order to show false
representation, the Trimms needed to come forward with a witness who
overheard Davis tell Kessler that the Trimms were not honest people.
143
Given Kessler's vulnerable mental state at the time, the court determined
that the evidence presented could not definitively establish that Davis
ever made such a statement to Kessler. 144
The court again applied the clear, cogent, and convincing standard in
In re Estate of Mumby145 to find that a living trust was not the product of
fraud. 146 Mumby involved a living trust and a pour-over will that Darlene
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. 95 Wash. App. 358, 977 P.2d 591 (1999).
137. Id. at 374, 977 P.2d at 601.
138. See id. at 374-75, 977 P.2d at 601.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 375, 977 P.2d at 601-02.
141. See id. at 375, 977 P.2d at 601.
142. See id. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 376, 977 P. 2d at 602 (explaining that testatrix was found to be suffering from
dementia, and thus her claim that Davis had told her about Trimms could not be considered factual
by court).
145. 97 Wash. App. 385, 982 P.2d 1219 (1999).
146. Id. at 387, 982 P.2d at 1221.
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Wood, the daughter of the testator, Samuel Wood, claimed had been
procured by fraud. 147 Darlene contended that James Caldwell, the
beneficiary of the trust, made false representations to Samuel. 148 Darlene
believed that Caldwell told Samuel that Darlene intended to clear-cut
Samuel's 38-acre parcel of land. 149 Despite testimony from one witness
stating that Samuel attributed his belief to comments made by Caldwell
that Darlene would log his land, the court found the evidence insufficient
to show fraudulent inducement by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence. 1
50
B. Other Jurisdictions Apply a Clear and Convincing Standard in the
Execution of a Lost Will
Many jurisdictions in the United States impose some form of the clear
and convincing standard to prove proper execution of a lost will.' 5' The
state supreme courts of Nebraska and North Carolina recently applied
the clear and convincing standard in lost will cases.'5 2 In In re Will of
McCauley,153 the Supreme Court of North Carolina found witness
testimony insufficient to prove execution by clear, strong, and
convincing proof.154 The witness, a secretary at a law firm, oversaw the
will-signing but did not sign the will as an attesting witness. 155 The
secretary recalled the name of one attesting witness but could not
remember the identity of the second attesting witness. 156 In finding the
witness's testimony insufficient, the North Carolina court was careful to
stipulate that it was not creating a "two witness requirement.', 157 The
court explained the distinction between the two witnesses required for
147. Id. at 388, 982 P.2d at 1221-22.
148. See id. at 392, 982 P.2d 1224.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. At least fifteen states use a clear and convincing standard, including Arkansas, Georgia,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington. R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Proof of Due
Execution of Lost Will, 41 A.L.R. 2d 393, § 4 (Supp. 2005).
152. See In re Estate of Mecello, 633 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Neb. 2001); In re Will of McCauley, 565
S.E.2d 88, 95 (N.C. 2002).
153. 565 S.E.2d 88 (N.C. 2002).
154. See id. at 95.
155. Id. at 90.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 92.
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properly executing a will and the requirements for proving that a lost
will was duly executed.158 The court stated that "[w]hile only one
attesting witness to a will would not be sufficient for valid execution,
one witness' testimony that the will was attested by two witnesses may
be sufficient to show that the will was duly executed."'' 59 Thus, the North
Carolina court refused to admit the lost will, not because only one
witness testified to the execution, but because the evidence presented by
that witness was insufficient to show valid execution.
1 60
Similarly, in In re Estate of Mecello,161 the Supreme Court of
Nebraska found that proof of execution may be shown by secondary
evidence that is direct, clear, and convincing.162 In addition to testifying
to his own attestation of the will, the only testifying witness could recall
the name and presence of the notary who notarized the will but not the
name of the second attesting witness.' 63 The court found this testimony
sufficient to meet the direct, clear, and convincing standard, in part
because it was unclear whether the notary could have also served as a
second attesting witness, meeting Nebraska's will execution
requirements. 164
In sum, by applying the clear, cogent, and convincing standard of
proof to a lost will's execution in Black, the court adopted an evidentiary
standard familiar to Washington probate law and similar to other states'
standards of proof for execution of a lost will. The application of the
clear, cogent, and convincing standard is commonly used in Washington
to prove the inducement of a will through fraud. Many other states
employ some form of the clear and convincing burden in admitting lost
wills. Two of these states have recently clarified their clear and
convincing standards in circumstances similar to those in Black.
IV. TESTIMONY FROM ONLY ONE WITNESS MAY SATISFY
THE CLEAR, COGENT, AND CONVINCING STANDARD
After Black, testimony from a single witness with sufficient personal
knowledge can prove the valid execution of a lost will. Yet ambiguity in
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. 633 N.W.2d 892 (Neb. 2001).
162. Id. at 900-01.
163. Id. at 896.
164. See id. at 900-01.
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the Black court's dicta has led some to interpret the clear, cogent, and
convincing standard as creating a "two witness requirement," demanding
testimony from both attesting witnesses. 165 However, the Black court's
evidentiary analysis reveals that the court adopted only a "one witness
standard." 166 Although the evidence presented in Black did not satisfy
the clear, cogent, and convincing standard, a single testifying witness
with sufficient personal knowledge could prove valid execution of a lost
will. 167  Those who interpret Black as creating a "two witness
requirement"' 168  conflate the distinction between the statutory
requirements for validly executing a will, and the requirements for
proving execution of a will that has been lost. 169 Moreover, reading
Black to adopt a "one witness standard" is consistent with Washington
case law interpreting the "clear and convincing" standard in other
probate contexts, as well as lost will cases from other jurisdictions with
similar standards. 1 70
A. The Black Court's Evidentiary Analysis Demonstrates That a
Single Witness With Sufficient Personal Knowledge Would Have
Proven the Valid Execution of the Lost Will
The evidentiary analysis in Black indicates that the court adopted a
"one witness standard." 171 The court rejected the combination of
testimony from one attesting witness, Reiter, and strong circumstantial
evidence from a second witness, Taylor. 172 Based upon this rejection,
proponents of the "two witness requirement" conclude that the court
165. See In re Estate of Black, 153 Wash. 2d 152, 183, 102 P.3d 796, 812 (2004) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting). This Comment assumes that because Justices Sanders and Chambers interpreted Black
to require two witnesses, others will share this interpretation.
166. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804 (majority opinion) (finding testimony of only one attesting
witness insufficient to prove proper execution of lost will because he could not recall identity of
second attesting witness).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 179, 102 P.3d at 810 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (arguing that because legislature
changed lost will statute to require "any" witnesses to lost will to testify to lost will's execution in
writing, statute requires every witness to testify).
169. Cf In re Will of McCauley, 565 S.E.2d 88, 92 (N.C. 2002) (noting confusion between
elements necessary for executing will and requirements for proving valid will once lost).
170. See infra Part IV.C.
171. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 167, 102 P.3d at 804 (analyzing testimony of one attesting
witness to determine whether he possessed sufficient personal knowledge of second attesting
witness to prove execution of lost will by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence).
172. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804.
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now requires testimony from two attesting witnesses to meet the clear,
cogent, and convincing standard. 73 However, proponents of the "two
witness requirement" ignore the court's stipulation that witnesses in lost
will cases may only testify to facts within their personal knowledge.
174
As a result, the majority did not reject the evidence because only one
attesting witness testified, but rather because no single witness possessed
sufficient personal knowledge to prove that all of the statutory
requirements necessary for validly executing a will were met.
175
1. The Evidentiary Deficiency in Black Was The Witnesses'Lack of
Personal Knowledge, Not the Insufficient Number of Witnesses
The Black court's evidentiary analysis reveals that rather than
requiring two witnesses, the court attempted to find a single witness with
sufficient personal knowledge to prove the lost will's execution. 76 The
court examined the testimony of three witnesses. 177 The first, Blauert,
the drafting attorney, had no personal knowledge of the execution
because he was not present at the will-signing. 178 In addition, his
testimony could not corroborate any other testimony because he could
not independently recall the names of the attesting witnesses appearing
on the will.
179
After rejecting the testimony of the first of three witnesses, the court
dismissed the testimony of the second witness.1 80 Although more
informative than Blauert's testimony, the court found testimony from
Taylor insufficient because she lacked personal knowledge of the will-
signing event.' 8' Taylor, the notary public and alleged second attesting
witness, testified that she could remember neither executing a will for
Margaret nor meeting either Myrna or Reiter. 8 2 Therefore, Taylor could
173. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 183, 102 P.3d at 812 (Sanders, J. dissenting) (arguing that court
has on several occasion used testimony of fewer than two attesting witnesses to prove valid
execution of lost will).
174. Id. at 166, 102 P.3d at 804.
175. See id. at 166-67, 102 P.3d at 804 (finding Reiter's testimony insufficient to prove presence
of two attesting witnesses).
176. See id.
177. See id. at 158-59, 102 P.3d at 799-800.
178. See id. at 158-59, 102 P.3d at 800.
179. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 159, 102 P.3d at 800.
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only speculate that she witnessed Margaret's will based on
circumstantial evidence. 183 Although Taylor may have been the second
attesting witness, she was not an adequate evidentiary witness for
purposes of the clear, cogent, and convincing standard because she had
no personal knowledge of the execution.' 84 The court, however, did not
go so far as to claim that Taylor's testimony demonstrating her own
independent recollection of the will-signing could serve as the only other
possible evidence sufficient to meet the clear, cogent, and convincing
standard. 185 If the court truly was applying a "two witness requirement,"
the inquiry would have stopped after the court's rejection of both
Blauert's and Taylor's testimony.
186
Instead, the court looked to the testimony of the third witness, Reiter,
to determine whether his testimony, standing alone, could prove all of
the elements of the will's execution.' 87 The court found Reiter's
testimony insufficient under the "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard
because he lacked personal knowledge that each element of will
execution had been met. 88 He had personal knowledge of the written
will, Margaret's signature, and his presence as an attesting witness, but
he lacked personal knowledge of the second attesting witness's
identity. 189 Reiter could only speculate that Taylor served as the second
witness based on circumstantial evidence. 190 Therefore, Reiter's
testimony failed to establish the identity of the second attesting witness,
a statutory requirement to the proper execution of a will.
The court utilized the "one witness standard," because if Reiter
recalled the identity of the second attesting witness, his testimony alone
183. See id. (noting that Taylor only notarized documents in presence of signer).
184. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804.
185. See id. (stating that because neither Reiter nor Taylor could recall Taylor witnessing will,
their testimony could not prove valid execution).
186. The court began its inquiry by determining that Reiter acted as the first attesting witness and
ended its inquiry by concluding that Reiter could not sufficiently identify Taylor as the second
attesting witness. See id. at 166-67, 102 P.3d at 803-04. For the sake of clarity, this Comment deals
with these two discussions together.
187. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804.
188. See id. (finding Reiter's testimony insufficient to prove two witnesses signed will in
Margaret's presence because Reiter could not independently identify second attesting witness).
189. See id. at 166, 102 P.3d at 803-04.
190. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804 (finding that Reiter believed Taylor to have been second
attesting witness because she notarized power of attorney document for Margaret on same day lost
will was allegedly executed).
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would have proved the lost will's execution. 191 The court's evidentiary
analysis reveals that rather than requiring testimony from two attesting
witnesses, the court actually established a "one witness standard" in
which at least one witness must have personal knowledge of all of the
elements of the execution in order to meet the clear, cogent, and
convincing standard. Thus, Myrna fell short of this standard not because
she lacked a second witness to the execution, but because she could not
produce even one witness with sufficient personal knowledge of the
execution. 192
B. Proponents of the "Two Witness Requirement" Conflate the
Distinction Between the Requirements for Valid Execution and the
Proof of Execution Under the Lost Will Statute
Reading the Black opinion to create a "two witness requirement"
conflates the requirements of properly executing a will with those of
proving proper execution of a lost will. 193 The requirements for
executing a will under RCW 11.12.020 include the presence of "two"
attesting witnesses. 194 The lost will statute, RCW 11.20.070, on the other
hand, conditions probating a lost will on "proof of the execution and
validity" that "must be reduced to writing and signed by any witnesses
who have testified as to the execution and validity." 195 Therefore, the
statutory requirements for proving proper execution of a lost will simply
amount to providing and establishing proof of execution and requiring
that any witnesses who testify to the execution do so in writing.
96
Because the majority found the testimony of one attesting witness in
Black insufficient to prove execution of the lost will under RCW
11.20.070, the dissent concluded that the court utilized a "two witness
requirement," requiring testimony from both attesting witnesses required
by RCW 11.12.020.' 9'
However, the majority in Black understood the distinction between
the "two" attesting witnesses required by RCW 11.12.020, and the
191. See id. (finding Reiter's testimony insufficient to prove existence of second attesting
witness).
192. See id.
193. See In re Will of McCauley, 565 S.E.2d 88, 92 (N.C. 2002).
194. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020(1) (2004).
195. Id. § 11.12.070(1).
196. See id. § 11.12.070(1).
197. See Black, 153 Wash. 2dat 179, 102 P.3d at 810 (Sanders, J. dissenting).
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witness testimony required to prove valid execution of a lost will under
RCW 11.20.070.198 First, the court looked at RCW 11.12.020, stating
that in order to prove that the will was executed Myrna must show that
two attesting witnesses signed the lost will. 199 The court then turned to
RCW 11.20.070 to explain how Myrna could prove the presence of two
attesting witnesses under the lost will statute. 20 0 The court did not state
that "two" attesting witnesses must teIstify that "two" witnesses signed
the will.20 1 Rather, dicta in Black suggests that proof of valid execution
of a lost will may be shown by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence if
a witness draws upon his or her personal knowledge to identify the two
witnesses who signed the will.20
2
C. Reading Black to Create a "One Witness Standard" Is Consistent
With the Application of the Clear and Convincing Standard in
Washington Fraud Cases and Lost Will Cases From Other States
Black should be read to create a "one witness standard" because such
an interpretation is consistent with the application of the clear, cogent,
and convincing standard to prove fraudulent inducement of a will,20 3 and
in other jurisdictions with similar lost will standards.20 4 In the
progression of lost will jurisprudence, Washington courts have
developed an analogy between the direct evidence required to prove
fraud under the statute of frauds and the evidence required under the lost
will statute.2 °5 In Washington, proving fraudulent inducement of a will
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence only requires the testimony of
a single witness with sufficient personal knowledge, not the testimony of
two witnesses.20 6 Reading Black to create a "two witness requirement"
198. See id. at 164-65, 102 P.3d at 803 (majority opinion).
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 165, 102 P.3d at 803.
202. See id. at 167, 102 P.3d at 804 (finding Reiter's testimony insufficient to prove valid
execution of will because he failed to independently identify second attesting witness).
203. In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wash. 2d 518, 533, 957 P.2d 755, 763 (1998).
204. See In re Estate of Mecello, 633 N.W.2d 892, 900 (Neb. 2001); In re Will of McCauley, 565
S.E.2d 88, 95 (N.C. 2002).
205. See In re Borrow, 123 Wash. 2d 128, 130, 212 P. 149, 150 (1923) (noting Clark court's
discussion of how policies underlying evidentiary rules in statute of frauds should be applied in lost
will cases to prevent submission of false wills (citing Clark v. Turner, 69 N.W. 843, 846 (1897))).
206. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764; In re Estate of Mumby, 97 Wash. App. 385,
392-93, 982 P.2d 1219, 1224 (1999); In re Estate of Kessler, 95 Wash. App. 358, 375-76, 977 P.2d
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for lost wills would be inconsistent with these fraud cases.
Additionally, the Washington State Supreme Court has a history of
looking to other states' laws when applying evidentiary standards in the
lost will context.208 Courts in other jurisdictions only require testimony
from a single witness with sufficient personal knowledge to prove
execution of a lost will by clear and convincing evidence. 20 9 Reading
Black to require a second witness would contradict the lost will
jurisprudence from these other states.210
1. The Application of the Clear and Convincing Standard in
Fraudulent Inducement Cases Supports the "One Witness
Standard"
Fraudulent inducement cases are analogous to lost will cases and
provide guidance in the application of the clear, cogent, and convincing
standard.211 In 1923 the Washington State Supreme Court cited a
Nebraska Supreme Court case as the collation of authority on the
evidentiary requirements for admitting lost wills to probate.21 2 The
Nebraska court explained that the fraud and lost will statutes were linked
by common policy goals and should therefore be linked by common
evidentiary standards.21 3 As Washington's probate law developed, the
analogy between fraudulent inducement and lost will execution
remained. Washington courts require direct evidence to prove both the
elements of fraudulent inducement of a will 214 and the elements of lost
will execution by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.215 Unlike other
591,602 (1999).
207. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764; Mumby, 97 Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at
1223; Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602.
208. See Borrow, 123 Wash. at 130, 212 P. at 150 (stating that authorities on evidentiary
standards required for lost wills have been collated in Clark, 69 N.W. at 846).
209. See Mecello, 633 N.W.2d at 900 (admitting lost will where only one attesting witness could
testify to will's execution); McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 90 (finding testimony of single attesting
witness sufficient to prove execution of lost will).
210. See McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 90; Mecello, 633 N.W.2d at 900.
211. See Clark, 69 N.W. at 846.
212. See Borrow, 123 Wash. at 130, 212 P. at 150 (stating that Clark court collated authorities on
evidentiary standards required in lost will cases (citing Clark, 69 N.W. at 846)).
213. See Clark, 69 N.W. at 846 (explaining that because policies underlying statute of wills are
same as those underlying statue of frauds, statute of frauds' bar on parol evidence should be applied
under statute of wills to bar submission of allegedly lost will).
214. See In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wash. 2d 518, 533, 957 P.2d 755, 763 (1998).
215. See In re Estate of Black, 153 Wash. 2d 152, 167, 102 P.3d 796, 804 (2004) (finding
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will contest claims that require clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,
proving the statutory elements of both lost will execution and fraudulent
inducement turn on proving the occurrence of particular events, not the
state of mind of the testator. In the lost will context, proponents of the
will must prove that the testator and two witnesses signed the will.21 7 In
the fraud context, will contestants must establish that a beneficiary of the
contested will made a false representation to the testator. 2, 8 Both claims
require direct evidence meeting the clear, cogent, and convincing
burden.21 9
Reading Black to adopt a "one witness standard" is consistent with
the use of the clear, cogent, and convincing standard in will contest cases
involving fraud. In these fraud cases, the courts only require testimony
from a single witness, just as the Black court looked to the testimony of
a single witness-Reiter.220  In addition, like the Black court's
requirement that Reiter have sufficient personal knowledge of each
element of execution,22' the courts in the fraud cases require witnesses to
have personal knowledge of each element of fraud.222 Moreover, these
courts uniformly reject circumstantial evidence,223 much like the Black
testimony of one attesting witness insufficient to prove valid execution of will because he relied on
circumstantial evidence to identify second attesting witness).
216. Proving undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity requires a showing by a "totality
of evidence" rather than direct evidence of a single event. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d
at 763; In re Estate of Mumby, 97 Wash. App. 385, 392-93, 982 P.2d 1219, 1224 (1999); In re
Estate of Kessler, 95 Wash. App. 358, 375-76, 977 P.2d 591, 602 (1999). Direct evidence of a
single event is crucial for proving fraudulent representation. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957
P.2d at 764.
217. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 165, 102 P.3d at 803.
218. See In re Dand's Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 158, 163-64, 247 P.2d 1016, 1020 (1952).
219. Compare Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 167, 102 P.3d at 804 (requiring witness to have direct,
personal knowledge rather than relying on circumstantial evidence to prove execution of lost will),
with Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 533, 957 P.2d at 764 (requiring direct evidence of misrepresentation
rather than circumstantial evidence to prove that beneficiary fraudulently misrepresented feelings of
love to testator).
220. See, e.g., Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764 (arguing that evidence from single
witness with personal knowledge that petitioner lied to testatrix would prove fraudulent
inducement); Mumby, 97 Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at 1223 (finding evidence insufficient to
prove fraudulent inducement because no single witness had personal knowledge of any false
representation); Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602 (determining that because no
single witness overheard respondent tell testatrix that petitioners were stealing from her, petitioners
could not prove fraudulent inducement).
221. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 167, 102 P. 3d at 804.
222. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764.
223. See, e.g., id. (refusing to allow evidence that Christian was seeing other women when he told
Estelle that he loved her prove that he falsely misrepresented his feelings of love); Mumby, 97
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court rejected circumstantial evidence regarding Taylor's attestation.224
Reading Black's application of the clear, cogent, and convincing
standard to require two witnesses is not consistent with the use of the
same evidentiary standard in these fraudulent inducement cases.
225
First, as in Black, the courts in these fraud cases require only a single
witness to prove fraudulent inducement of a will by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. 6  For instance, in Lint the evidence was
insufficient to prove false representation because the opponents of the
will failed to come forward with even a single witness.227 Lint involved a
question of whether Christian, the beneficiary of the will, fraudulently
procured the will of Estelle by falsely representing that he loved her.228
The court stated that to prove false representation by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence, opponents of the will needed direct evidence, such
as a witness who overheard Christian admit that he lied to Estelle about
his feelings.229 Similarly, through its careful analysis of Reiter's
testimony, the Black court demonstrated that the testimony of a single
witness could have been sufficient to satisfy the clear, cogent, and
convincing standard.230 Had Reiter been able to recall the name of the
second attesting witness, he would have proven execution of Margaret's
lost will.
Second, like Black, the courts in these fraud cases require the witness
to have sufficient personal knowledge to prove fraud by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence.23 ' For instance, in Kessler, the Trimms
Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at 1223 (rejecting claims of fraudulent inducement based on testimony
of events occurring at time of will's execution); Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602
(finding insufficient evidence to show false representation despite statements made by testatrix to
her guardian ad litem demonstrating that such false representations had been made).
224. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 167, 102 P. 3d at 804.
225. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764 (requiring single witness with personal
knowledge of false representation); Mumby, 97 Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at 1223 (stating that
testimony from witness overhearing respondent make false representations to testatrix was required
to show fraudulent inducement); Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602 (holding that
evidence was insufficient to prove fraudulent inducement because no single witness had personal
knowledge of any false representation).
226. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764; Mumby, 97 Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at
1223; Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602.
227. Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 167, 102 P. 3d at 804.
231. See, e.g., Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764 (arguing that evidence from single
witness with personal knowledge that petitioner lied to testatrix would prove fraudulent
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claimed that the beneficiary, Davis, fraudulently induced the testator to
write a new will by telling the testator that the Trimms had mishandled
her money.232 However, the court determined that the Trimms failed to
prove fraudulent inducement because their witness lacked sufficient
personal knowledge of Davis's false representation.2 3 3 Similarly, in
Mumby, Darlene, the testator's daughter, argued that James Caldwell
fraudulently induced the testator to place his land in trust for
Caldwell.234 Once again, the court found insufficient proof to show
fraudulent inducement by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
because no witness had sufficient personal knowledge of the falsity of
Caldwell's statements.2 Finally, the court in Lint required the will
opponents to come forward with at least one witness who overheard
Christian admit that he lied to the testator about his love for her.236
Because no witness had personal knowledge of the falsity of Christian's
professions of love, the opponents failed to prove fraudulent inducement
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.23 ' These fraud cases parallel
the analysis in Black, where the court determined that none of the
witnesses had sufficient personal knowledge of the execution to prove
that two attesting witnesses signed the lost will.23 8 Thus, they failed to
prove execution by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.239
Finally, just as in Black, the courts in these fraud cases uniformly
reject the use of circumstantial evidence to satisfy the clear, cogent, and
convincing standard.240 For example, the Lint court explained that the
clear, cogent, and convincing burden requires more than merely
circumstantial evidence. 24' Even evidence disclosing that Christian was
inducement); Mumby, 97 Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at 1223 (finding evidence insufficient to
prove fraudulent inducement because no single witness had personal knowledge of any false
representation); Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602 (ruling that because no single
witness overheard respondent tell testatrix that petitioners were stealing from her, petitioners could
not prove fraudulent inducement).
232. See Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375, 977 P.2d at 602.
233. See id.
234. See Mumby, 97 Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at 1223.
235. See id. at 393, 982 P.2d at 1224.
236. Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 763.
237. See id.
238. See In re Estate of Black, 153 Wash. 2d 152, 167, 102 P.3d 796, 804 (2004).
239. Id.
240. See id.; In re Estate of Kessler, 95 Wash. App. 358, 375-76, 977 P.2d 591, 602 (1999).
241. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 763 (finding that circumstantial evidence could
not be used under clear, cogent, and convincing standard to prove that beneficiary misrepresented
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seeing other women at the time he told Estelle he loved her could not
prove that his "expressions of love for Estelle were less than 
sincere. 242
Similarly, the Black court found that Taylor's notarization of Margaret's
power of attorney document was insufficient to prove that Taylor served
as the second attesting witness, although this did provide strong
circumstantial evidence that Taylor was present at the execution of the
will.
243
If the court adopted a "two witness requirement" to satisfy the clear,
cogent, and convincing standard for lost wills, it would be introducing a
standard not present in the clear, cogent, and convincing burden for
fraud: the testimony of a second witness. 24 These courts applied a "one
witness standard" for proving fraudulent inducement by requiring that a
single witness with sufficient personal knowledge prove that the
beneficiary made false representations to the testator.245 In none of these
cases, however, did the court even mention the need for a second
246
testifying witness. Thus, reading Black to adopt the "one witness
standard" under the lost will statute is consistent with case law
identifying fraudulent inducement of a will.
2. Other Jurisdictions Employing Similar Clear and Convincing
Standards Support Reading Black as Creating a "One Witness
Standard"
Interpreting Black to adopt a "one witness standard" is consistent with
courts in other states that require clear and convincing proof of a lost
will's execution.24 7 These courts also adopt a "one witness standard,"
feelings of love toward testatrix).
242. Id.
243. See Black, 153 Wash. 2d at 167, 102 P. 3d at 804.
244. See, e.g., Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 764 (arguing that evidence from single
witness with personal knowledge that petitioner lied to testatrix would prove fraudulent
inducement); In re Estate of Mumby, 97 Wash. App. 385, 391, 982 P.2d 1219, 1223 (1999) (finding
evidence insufficient to prove fraudulent inducement because no single witness had personal
knowledge of any false representation); Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602 (ruling
that because no single witness overheard respondent tell testatrix that petitioners were stealing from
her, petitioners could not prove fraudulent inducement).
245. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 763; Mumby, 97 Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at
1223; Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602.
246. See Lint, 135 Wash. 2d at 534, 957 P.2d at 763; Mumby, 97 Wash. App. at 391, 982 P.2d at
1223; Kessler, 95 Wash. App. at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 602.
247. See In re Estate of Mecello, 633 N.W.2d 892, 900 (Neb. 2001); In re Will of McCauley, 565
S.E.2d 88, 90 (N.C. 2002).
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allowing testimony by one witness with sufficient personal knowledge to
prove execution by clear and convincing evidence.248 Additionally, one
of these courts rejected a proposed "two witness requirement" because it
conflated the two attesting witnesses necessary for proper execution
with the single testifying witness required to prove execution. 249 Taken
together, decisions from these out-of-state courts further bolster the
argument for reading Black to adopt a "one witness standard."
Courts in other jurisdictions also employ a "one witness standard" to
prove execution of a lost will.250 For instance, in McCauley, the North
Carolina Supreme Court found testimony insufficient to meet the clear,
strong, and convincing burden because the witness could identify only
one of the attesting witnesses by name.251 Conversely, in Mecello, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska found testimony from a single attesting
witness sufficient to prove valid execution by "direct, clear, and
convincing" evidence.252  There, the witness recalled personally
witnessing the will and could remember the name of the notary who
signed the will in the presence of the testator. 3 These courts allow the
testimony of a single witness to satisfy the clear and convincing burden,
where that witness has sufficient personal knowledge of the will's
execution.254 Reading Black to adopt a "one witness standard" would be
consistent with these out-of-state courts that also follow a similar "one
witness standard."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has rejected a "two witness
requirement" in similar circumstances by clarifying the distinction
between testifying witnesses and attesting witnesses.255 In McCauley, the
North Carolina court explained that, like the proponents of the "two
witness requirement" in Black, the petitioner confused the distinction
between the two "attesting" witnesses necessary to execute a will and the
witness testimony necessary to prove execution of a lost will.25 6 The
court explained, "while only one attesting witness to a will would not be
sufficient for valid execution, one witness' testimony that the will was
248. See Mecello, 633 N.W.2d at 900; McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 90.
249. See Mecello, 633 N.W.2d at 900; McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 90.
250. See Mecello, 633 N.W.2d at 900; McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 90.
251. See McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 90.
252. See Mecello, 633 N.W.2d at 900.
253. See id. at 896.
254. See id.
255. See McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 93.
256. See id. at 92.
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attested by two witnesses may be sufficient to show that the will was
duly executed." '257 In Black, the dissent interpreted the majority's
opinion as requiring two testifying witnesses,258 but, like the McCauley
plaintiff, this "two witness requirement" confuses the distinction
between attesting and testifying witnesses.
259
Reading Black to adopt the "one witness standard" in the lost will260
context is consistent with case law from other jurisdictions. Courts in
these jurisdictions have rejected a "two witness requirement," finding
that it confuses the distinction between attesting witnesses and testifying
witnesses.261 In addition, these courts, like the Black court, consistently
demonstrate that testimony from a single witness with sufficient
personal knowledge of the statutory elements of execution may prove
the execution of a lost will by clear and convincing evidence.262
In sum, Black creates a "one witness standard" to prove execution of
a lost will. Testimony from a single witness with personal knowledge
that the will was in writing, signed by the testator and witnessed by at
least two attesting witnesses now serves to prove execution of a lost will
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The court's evidentiary
analysis in Black, examining the testimony of all three witnesses,
demonstrates the application of the "one witness standard." In addition,
applying a "two witness requirement" would be inconsistent with the
court's application of the clear, cogent, and convincing standard in other
probate contexts, including fraud. Moreover, adopting a "one witness
standard" in Black would be consistent with recent case law in other
jurisdictions with similar standards.
V. CONCLUSION
The Black court adopted a "one witness standard" to prove valid
execution of a lost will by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. This
standard parallels evidentiary standards used in other probate contexts,
257. Id.
258. In re Estate of Black, 153 Wash. 2d 152, 175, 102 P.3d 796, 808 (2004) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
259. See McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 92-93 (explaining confusion between number of witnesses
required to execute will and number of witnesses required to prove valid execution of lost will).
260. See id. at 90; In re Estate of Mecello, 633 N.W.2d 892, 900 (Neb. 2001).
261. See, e.g., McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 92-93 (noting that petitioner confused distinction
between "attesting" witnesses and "testifying" witnesses).
262. See Mecello, 633 N.W.2d at 900; McCauley, 565 S.E.2d at 90.
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as well as those standards used by other jurisdictions to prove lost wills.
Those who interpret the majority in Black as adopting a "two witness
requirement" conflate the statutory elements required for executing a
will with those necessary for proving a lost will. The "two witness
requirement" places too heavy a burden on those wishing to probate a
lost will. Under the old lost will statute, proving the existence of the lost
will at the testator's death routinely barred lost wills from probate. By
removing this requirement in the new statute, the legislature intended for
the courts to become more receptive to lost wills. The "two witness
requirement," on the other hand, would subvert legislative intent by
replacing the old "existence at the time of death" bar with a new bar.
Thus, in order to uphold the legislative intent behind the statute, Black
should be read as requiring merely one witness to probate a lost will.
